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2. An international perspective on the 
determinants of local government 
fragmentation 
Juan Luis Gomez-Reino and 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Subnational government fragmentation, associated with the small size of 
jurisdictions to take advantage of economies of scale in service delivery, is 
a commonly perceived problem in many decentralized systems around the 
globe. Subnational government fragmentation typically takes the form of 
an excessive number of subnational jurisdictions at any level of govern­
ment, most often at the local or municipal level. But fragmentation may 
also have other manifestations, including in particular the number of tiers 
or levels of subnational governments. 
As is to be expected, however, the degree of jurisdictional fragmentation 
varies widely from country to country and through different regions of the 
world. In order to examine the extent and determinants of jurisdictional 
fragmentation in this chapter, we will use the most recent available infor­
mation for a sample of 197 countries. The analysis of the raw data shows 
considerable diversity in terms of jurisdictional fragmentation. In terms of 
the number of tiers of government (in addition to the central government 
tier), as shown in Figure 2.1, in our sample 10 countries report having four 
tiers of governments, while 50 countries report three. On the other hand, 
more than 50 percent of the countries in our sample have only two levels 
of government, including countries vastly different in terms of population, 
ethnic composition, etc. 
Equally, the absolute number of subnational jurisdictions per country 
ranges widely in the sample, from a minimum of 0 in the tiny island 
nation of Kiribati (only a central level government) to a maximum of over 
240,000 in India (including the Gram panchayat or village level of govern­
ment). The median value of the number of subnational jurisdictions is 
situated at 194. 
8 
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Figure 2.2 offers information on the distribution of the sample in terms 
of the absolute number of jurisdictions per country. A total of 42 coun­
tries in our sample report more than one thousand subnational jurisdic­
tions including all subnational tiers of government. A similar number of 
countries (51) report less than 50 jurisdictions in total. 
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Table 2.1 Correlations: number of jurisdictions and selected sample 
variables 
Number Pop. Area Gini GDP HDI 
jurisdictions coefficient pc 
Number of jurisdictions 1 
Population 0.74 1 
Area 0.25 0.44 1 
Gini coefficient -0.04 0.02 0.09 1 
GDP pc -0.02 -0.06 0.08 -0.48 1 
Human Development -0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.41 0.76 
Index 
As is suggested by the simple correlations presented in Table 2.1, the 
total number of jurisdictions is strongly correlated with the country's 
population, but, and a bit surprisingly, only weakly so with the geographi­
cal area of the entire country. As a rough initial approximation to what 
other factors may play a role in determining the number of subnational 
jurisdictions per country, in Table 2.1 we also show the simple correlation 
coefficients of the absolute number of subnational jurisdictions with GDP 
per capita, the Gini measures of income inequality, and the human devel­
opment index. None of these variables appears to be correlated with the 
number of subnational jurisdictions across countries. 
The issue of jurisdictional fragmentation is one of considerable current 
policy relevance. The problem of suboptimal scale, real or perceived, 
continues to lead to significant policy actions in many countries around 
the world in terms of forced amalgamation programs or simply to the 
elimination of a variety of subnational governments, as witnessed by 
the very recent decisions taken by the governments of Greece and Italy 
in a drive to reduce public sector deficits. These programs of jurisdic­
tional consolidation across the world could be questioned considering 
the limited (and service-specific) evidence on economies of scale on local 
service delivery available from the empirical literature (Gomez-Reino and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). Forced consolidation programs appear to have 
yielded mixed results in terms of cost savings (Dollery and Robotti, 2009; 
Dowding and Mergoupis, 2003).1 The international experience seems to 
show that many other countries around the world, often times facing 
stilt political difficulties,2 are opting instead for adapting to high levels of 
jurisdictional fragmentation while encouraging the creation of new insti­
tutional modes for service delivery (e.g. special districts, inter-municipal 
cooperation, etc.). 
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The main questions addressed in this chapter are the identification 
of the main determinants of jurisdictional fragmentation as presently 
observed across countries and how well those findings line up with the 
predictions of the expanded standard model of optimal jurisdiction size. 
To our knowledge, to date, there does not exist a rigorous study analyzing 
the cross-country determinants of fragmentation in the way this issue has 
been previously analyzed for some particular countries. 
At the outset, country fixed effects can be expected to loom large and 
powerful. Each country's own history has been conditioned by a myriad 
of details, including colonial legacies, geography or ethnic and linguistic 
fragmentation, which are likely to have contributed to heterogeneous 
levels of fragmentation. These factors could all be summarized in what is 
often termed the long shadow or the "dead hand" of history. Indeed, some 
countries may still have the same vertical structure of government that 
they had many decades ago. But there are also many countries that have 
changed their governmental structures over the years. So in this chapter 
we would like to find out what may be the common determinants that 
have led to those changes, and also perhaps to better understand if those 
common determinants can be used to explain why other countries have 
changed so little. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we offer a 
simple extension of the conventional model for optimal jurisdiction size. 
In section 3 we review the literature on government fragmentation and 
its impact. In section 4 we outline the empirical model proposed for the 
analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation. In section 5 we present the results 
from our estimations. We conclude in section 6. 
2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF OPTIMAL JURISDICTION 
SIZE 
The standard economic model by Oates (1972) defines the problem of 
optimal jurisdictional size in the provision of services as consisting of 
two main tradeoffs. First, the tradeoff exists between the welfare gains 
expected from smaller governments (better placed to match expenditure 
allocation to local preferences) and economies of scale (or associated 
lower average costs) expected from the delivery of services at larger juris­
dictional sizes. On that basis, optimal size and therefore equilibrium in 
the number of jurisdictions would be reached when the difference between 
the marginal welfare gains from more efficient provision and the marginal 
costs derived from foregone economies of scale is maximized. The second 
critical tradeoff determining optimal jurisdictional size is that between the 
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closer accountability offered by smaller governments to their citizens and 
the higher management, administrative, and information costs associated 
with multiple jurisdictions for service delivery. 
In the mathematical appendix to his seminal work on fiscal decen­
tralization, Oates (1972) derives the equilibrium quantity that minimizes 
the welfare loss incurred from providing a common level of production 
(as opposed to that preferred by single individuals) for a given group of 
people. Therefore, his solution does not incorporate economies of scale 
or the role of accountability. In this section, we provide an extension of 
Oates's (1972) basic model using Buchanan's (1965) formulation of a 
theory of clubs and Alesina and Spolaore's (2003) uni-dimensional linear 
model where losses of welfare are measured as the distance between the 
individual's preferred consumption level of the public good G and the 
level provided as a result of the collective decision. Otherwise we maintain 
the customary assumptions of a constant and immobile population, zero 
transaction costs for collective decision-making and that the financing of 
the public good provision is efficiency-neutral (i.e. lump sum taxation). 
We assume that individuals have a quasi-linear utility function of the 
form: 
Ui = yi + ri(DGi) 
where DG| is equal to the difference, in absolute value, between the level 
of public good provided and the level that would maximize individual 
welfare, for each individual. Following Oates's original formulation, the 
sum of the differences between the level of public good provided and that 
which would maximize the individual's utility is likely to increase with the 
size of the jurisdiction (measured in population terms), and so, 
DGj = DG (G(N), Gf) 
Thus, the larger the difference between the level of public good provided 
and the individual's equilibrium quantity (Gf, signaling the heterogene­
ous preferences), the larger the loss in welfare, and the larger the amount 
by which overall individual utility would be reduced. Additionally, such 
distance to the individual optimum will be a function of the size of the 
jurisdiction in population terms N, as the level of G is a collective deci­
sion that will vary with population size. For simplicity, we assume that 
the utility decreases in an increasing way from larger distances from the 
individual's optimal level of G, and that equal distances to the individual 
optimum, be G above or below G*, translate into identical losses in 
welfare: 
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dUi IdDG, < 0. and d2 U, IdDGt 2 > 0 
dUi IdDGl = dUt ISDG2, for each DG1 = G* + and DG2 = Gf-% 
We define t (the tax price paid for the public good) as equal to the average 
cost of provision, or total cost (C) of production divided by the size of 
the population served. In turn, the total cost is defined as a function of the 
quantity produced: 
t = CIN; where C = C{G) 
As the size of the jurisdiction (N) increases, the average cost of provision 
of the public good (G) decreases, improving the individual's welfare level. 
The individual's utility from lower taxes (or average production costs), 
increases however in a decreasing way, represented by the positive value of 
the second derivative: 
dUi Idt < 0, andd2 (/,. Idt2 > 0 
An additional member to the jurisdiction adds another person to the col­
lective decision-making mechanism for the determination of G. Thus the 
sum of the distances between individual preferences of G (G,*) and the 
effective level finally provided increases, decreasing overall utility: 
IdUj/dN < 0. 
The budget restriction of the individual is: 
A/,. = y, + t 
Thus the individual's income (assumed exogenously determined) is spent 
on consumption of the private good y and the public good G for which 
he pays a price equal to t. From the individual maximization problem we 
obtain the individual's most preferred level of public good provision (Gf), 
which is the level of public good that would maximize the individual's 
utility given a set of prices. 
Lastly, the transformation function for the economy is of the form 
F(G,y, N) = 0, 
meaning that the production cost depends on the quantity produced and 
on the quantity of private good required that has to be surrendered for 
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its production. We further assume that the production cost for the public 
good presents economies of scale up to a certain range, after which it 
exhibits decreasing returns to scale later, thus giving us a U-shaped cost 
function. This assumption is later on relaxed and its implications are 
explored further. 
The individual faces the following maximization problem: 
Max [v, + U, (DGjiGiN), (?•)] 
s. t. Mi — y, + t 
By assuming a quasi-linear utility function, social welfare changes are 
equal to the summation of changes in welfare of all the individuals 
due to variations in t. Thus, if the government behaves as a benevo­
lent planner, it will try to maximize social welfare, defined as the sum 
of all individual utilities (again assuming the quasi-linear form of the 
utility functions), solving for the optimal size of the group for service 
provision. 
Thus we have a social welfare function (SW): 
StV=lUi = !>>,. + It/,. (DG,(G(AO, Gf) 
with the constraint for the entire economy given by the transformation 
function: 
F(G, y, N) = 0 
The optimal jurisdictional size can now be found from maximizing: 
£ = !>•,. + I.{Ul(DGi(G(N'), G*i)} - IF(G, >>,, N) 
with the first order conditions (FOC): 
d£/dy, = 1 - X(dF/dy) = 0 
d£IdG = X{(dt/ /dZ)G,)* (dDGJdG)) - X(dF/dG) = 0 
d£/dN = I {(dUi IdDG.)* (dDGi IdG)* (dG/dN)} - X(dFldN) = 0 
from which we obtain 
I(0t/,. /dDG)*(dDG/dG) = (dFldG)l(dFldy) 
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This says that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the 
public good (G) and the private good (Y) equals the marginal rate of 
transformation between the public and the private good: 
I MRS'GY = MRTCY 
which is the well-known Samuelson condition, also reached in Buchanan's 
(1965) theory of clubs. 
The optimal size of N can also be obtained from the FOC as: 
11 (d UJdDG,) *(dDG,/dG) *(dG/dN) } = (dF/dN)/2(dF/dy) 
also known as the "membership condition" in Buchanan's (1965) theory 
of clubs. 
We can re-write the equilibrium condition as: 
I MRS'NY = MRTNY 
where the RHS is the change in the average cost of provision from adding 
additional individuals to the population sharing the cost of provision. So 
we have that 
MRTNv = d(C/N)/dN = -ON2 
The optimal N* is given by: 
N* = L(-CI(LMRS'NY)) 
Thus, the optimal size of the jurisdiction is positively related to the size of 
the economies of scale and negatively related to the welfare costs derived 
from heterogeneous preferences. 
This mode! can now be easily expanded to take into account prefer­
ences for political representation/accountability, which, although not 
considered either in Oates's (1972) model, have the potential to signifi­
cantly affect optimal jurisdiction size. Arguably, as population increases 
(i.e. jurisdictional size), the relative power of the individual to influence 
government decisions (i.e. political accountability) is diluted (Seabright, 
1996; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 1999). Additionally, in the absence 
of a decentralized system of government, local political representatives 
may simply be central government appointees with vertical accountability 
to their superiors but no horizontal accountability to the jurisdiction's 
residents. But even if political representatives are elected locally, they 
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may be transfer-dependent and not enjoy sufficient fiscal autonomy 
to significantly determine expenditure and revenue patterns in their 
local governments. Higher accountability of local officials may also be 
increased by their physical proximity to the citizens (Ostrom et al., 1993) 
and by citizens' ability to compare government's performance against 
other local governments engaging in yardstick competition (Besley and 
Coate, 2003). 
We can model accountability by introducing a new variable for politi­
cal accountability (P), affecting the way preferences are reflected into a 
government's level of provision of the public good G. In particular we 
now define: 
DG = DG((G(N), G% P), whereby 
( dDG/dP ) < 0 
So the new representative individual's utility function would be: 
Uj = y,- + Ui {DG(G(N), Gf), P). 
Note that P is defined as P = P(N,D,FA,CP)y where D represents the exist­
ence of a decentralized government with locally elected representatives, 
FA reflects the degree of fiscal autonomy, and CP is a measure of citizen 
representation in government decision-making (such as the existence of 
participatory budgeting systems, etc.). Since an increase in jurisdictional 
size is related to lower individual capacity to influence the decisions of the 
politicians, we have (8P/dN) < 0. 
The maximization problem faced by the benevolent planner of the 
jurisdiction now becomes: 
Max £ = Y+lUi [DG(G(N), Gf), P(N)) - X(F(G, Y,N)] 
And as before we can obtain the Samuelson condition from the FOC 
IMRS'0 Y = MRT'g y 
and Buchanan's "membership condition" as 
I MRS*y = MRTNy 
where the superscript P denotes the marginal rate of substitution once 
political accountability is included in the individual utility function. 
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By definition, as (dU/dP) > 0 and (dPIdN) < 0, then (dU/dP)* 
(<dPIdN) < 0. AsZ{(dU(/dDG)* (dDGIdG)* (dGldN) is, by definition, nega­
tive (loss in social welfare from the addition of one more member to the 
jurisdiction), with the addition of (dt/, ldP)*(dPldN) we conclude that 
HMRS'fiyl > /IMRSy 
The absolute value of the loss in social welfare from one additional 
member to the jurisdiction is greater once we include a preference for 
political accountability in the individual's welfare function. Not only does 
utility decrease due to the addition of a new consumer's welfare loss in the 
form of G-G* but now citizens also lose individual capacity to influence 
the decision over G. 
Finally, solving for the optimal N, we obtain: 
N* = G-CPLMRSfiy) 
From the above we can conclude that N* < N*. That is, the optimal 
jurisdictional size for the provision of the public good is smaller once we 
introduce preferences for political accountability in the individual's utility 
function. 
In summary the creation of a new level of government would be theo­
retically justified if overall welfare is improved (considering losses from 
economies of scale, gains from tailoring preferences to citizens, and 
preferences for political accountability) by assigning the provision of 
public goods and services from the central (or other subnational) level 
of government to a new jurisdiction. 
3. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON 
GOVERNMENT FRAGMENTATION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
Although this chapter is about the determinants of jurisdictional fragmen­
tation as opposed to the impact of fragmentation, it is important to briefly 
note this latter issue. In reality, the level of government fragmentation has 
potentially important implications for an array of issues. So we start this 
review section by looking at some of those issues. Next, we review how 
in reality fragmentation has been measured in the literature. Third and 
last, we review what is known so far on the determinants of jurisdictional 
fragmentation. 
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On the Impact of Jurisdictional Fragmentation 
From a theoretical angle, public choice scholars have associated sub-
national government competition, supposedly enhanced by jurisdictional 
fragmentation, with the containment of bureaucracy and a Leviathan 
public sector. Greater competition in this view leads to an overall more 
efficient government with essentially leaner budgets (Niskanen, 1975; 
Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). The theoretical foundations for the poten­
tial benefits to be derived from subnational government fragmentation 
can be traced back to Tiebout's (1956) seminal proposition that citizens 
"vote with their feet" and choose the mix of services and taxes that best 
represent their preferences. Assuming adequate supply of local govern­
ments (which assumes away the problem of fragmentation but implies it), 
a Tiebout equilibrium is reached when each citizen maximizes the welfare 
obtained from the mix of goods and services provided by the local gov­
ernment, net of tax payments. Thus, a sufficient number of governments 
offering distinguishable tax and expenditure packages would be required 
for this efficient sorting of individuals. From this point of view, a certain 
level of fragmentation would be efficiency-enhancing, since a diversity of 
preferences requires a diversity of government service packages. 
Empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Some early papers, for 
example Sjoquist (1982), find that expenditures per capita in metropolitan 
regions of the U.S. decrease as the number of jurisdictions increases. More 
recently, Feld et al. (2003) find no evidence that fragmentation affects the 
size (in terms of expenditure budgets) of Swiss cantons. Earlier contribu­
tions of the literature have tended to suggest that augmenting the number 
of governments may lead to increases in the overall size of the public sector. 
This is likely to occur especially if economies of scale in public administra­
tion are foregone with greater decentralization (Oates, 1991), or if citizens' 
control over local bureaucracies translates into a wider range of services 
being provided (Zax, 1989). Among other reasons, this "larger public 
sector" result has been justified under the assumption of a lower quality of 
bureaucrats at the local government level, leading to poorer expenditure 
management and higher costs for services (Prud'homme, 1995). Another 
aspect affecting overall expenditures is public employment. In a recent 
cross-country study, Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) find that total 
public sector employment grows with fiscal decentralization, as increases 
in employment at the subnational level more than offset declines at the 
central government level. In practice, recent government policy measures 
across the world have been inspired by the belief that higher jurisdic­
tional fragmentation leads to larger expenditures. For example, pressure 
to reduce government spending seemed to be behind recent drives for 
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municipal amalgamation in Canada (Sancton, 2008). Similarly, the recent 
drives toward the elimination/forced amalgamation of local government 
in eurozone countries such as Greece and Italy have been based on the 
same beliefs that subnational government fragmentation is associated 
with larger expenditures. 
From an equity point of view, higher fragmentation has been suggested 
to lead to the separation of tax bases among rich and poor. Richer areas 
(such as suburban residential areas) have a clear incentive to separate from 
impoverished urban areas that are subsidized with the revenues collected 
from their tax bases. The end result of such motivated fragmentation may 
be higher inequalities in the provision of services. A highly fragmented 
local government level may also lead to more self-centered governments 
in terms of policy issues, reducing the incentives for coordination among 
jurisdictions to maximize overall welfare levels (Lewis, 1998). Earlier 
contributions seem to show, however, that higher income voters may be 
supportive of redistributive programs if they expect to obtain long term 
utility gains, such as overall increases in property values in the jurisdiction 
(Martinez-Vazquez, 1981). 
The literature is fairly rich in contributions exploring the effect of frag­
mentation on economic growth and urban sprawl. For example. Nelson 
and Foster (1999) argue that in the framework of metropolitan areas in the 
U.S., as decision-making becomes more fragmented (more local govern­
ments are present), growth in personal income declines. This is related to 
the fact that annexation of suburban areas is largely behind the increase 
in income growth of metropolitan areas, which are favored by their con­
solidation with affluent suburbs. Measures of sprawl used in the literature, 
very concentrated in the U.S. experience on the other hand, include popu­
lation density (as an indication of low-density development), the percent­
age of dwellings in single-unit detached houses, or housing units per square 
kilometer. In one of the few studies that analyzes the plausible reverse cau­
sation between fragmentation and urban sprawl, Razin and Rosentraub 
(2000) conclude that residential sprawl impacts positively on fragmenta­
tion, but fragmentation does not have a predictable effect on sprawl. 
Stansel (2005) finds a direct relationship between the number of local 
governments in the U.S. relative to population, and the level of economic 
growth. If greater fragmentation is related to greater decentralization, this 
finding is related to a larger literature on decentralization and growth.1 
On the Measurement of Jurisdictional Fragmentation 
The concept of jurisdictional fragmentation is not easily made opera­
tional. The literature has favored overall a measure of the number of local 
20 The challenge of local government size 
governments relative to the size, either in terms of land area or in terms 
of population (Nelson, 1992). However, the range of overlapping authori­
ties over the same territory (as ultimately, the institutional form chosen to 
deliver public services may take several forms) adds an extra complication 
to the estimation of government fragmentation levels. Optimal govern­
ment size, as Ostrom et al. (1999) argued, may depend on the nature of the 
public good provided and not just on the preferences of local consumers, 
leading to "polycentrism", or a system of multiple collective decision­
making mechanisms. Socio-spatial studies have termed this process "state 
rescaling", a redefinition of the role of government at all levels, including 
the involvement of non-governmental agencies in public service delivery, 
the allocation of further competencies through decentralization to sub-
national levels of government, and the assumption of former national 
competencies by supra-national institutions. In line with this argument, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2008) find that the trend towards decen­
tralization observed over the last decades has not affected, on average, the 
size of government, and offer empirical evidence of significant and posi­
tive relationships between globalization, decentralization and government 
size. 
On the Determinants of Jurisdictional Fragmentation 
Generally, there is a shortage of contributions exploring the determinants 
of the observed high fragmentation of local governments across the world. 
Most of this evidence comes from studies for the U.S. with some experi­
ences also from Canada and Australia. In what follows we review that 
evidence categorized by type of determinant. 
Do heterogeneous local preferences lead to greater fragmentation? 
As briefly discussed in the introduction, Oates's (1972) seminal contribu­
tion proposed a fundamental tradeoff in the determination of government 
jurisdiction size between the efficiency gains attained from tailoring local 
public good provision to local preferences, which is likely enhanced by 
government fragmentation, and economies of scale in service delivery, 
which is largely hurt by government fragmentation. We examine first 
what the empirical evidence is that heterogeneous preferences are actually 
behind the observed fragmentation of local governments. 
The measurement of preferences has traditionally been more difficult 
than the measurement of costs. However, there have been some successes 
in the attempt to make operational the heterogeneity of preferences in 
the economic literature. In his seminal contribution to the study of the 
determinants of government fragmentation in the U.S., Nelson (1992) 
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shows that the number of jurisdictions is positively correlated with the 
degree of heterogeneity of individual preferences, measured by income 
dispersion and age dispersion (i.e. more income and age dispersion leads 
to a higher number of governments).4 This finding aligns well with Oates's 
(1972) decentralization postulates. Nelson's analysis uses all types of gov­
ernments from the U.S. Census, including both elected general purpose 
governments (counties, cities, municipalities, etc.) and special districts. 
He finds that the correlation between heterogeneity and fragmentation is 
stronger in the case of special districts than for general purpose govern­
ments. Since, in general, special districts are easier to create and modify, 
the findings lend support to the argument that heterogeneity of local 
preferences leads to smaller jurisdictions. 
In a somewhat related fashion, using a sample of Californian cities, 
Musso (2001) finds that more affluent communities (with income as a 
proxy for diverse preferences) in fast-growing counties are more likely 
to form new cities. Conversely, Burns (1994) argues that changes in the 
level of access and quality of local services do not explain local govern­
ment formation, but instead tax avoidance and racial exclusion are found 
to be the most significant determinants. In line with Burns's findings, 
Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, and Walker (1997) find that increasing racial 
heterogeneity of a state population increases the number of school dis­
tricts, supposedly in order to satisfy their preference for disassociation. 
A related line of work has linked heterogeneity in preferences to further 
decentralization, which, of course, does not necessarily mean further frag­
mentation. Shelton (2007), using data from a wide sample of countries, 
finds that heterogeneity in preferences (measured by an index of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization) leads to further decentralization, measured 
as the share of local government expenditure in total government size. 
Decentralization is greater, Shelton shows, in the education and health 
sector, where one is more likely to find higher diversity of preferences due 
to social and demographic factors. 
Do economies of scale in service delivery lead to less fragmentation? 
The evidence of the presence of economies of scale in the delivery of 
certain public services is solid and largely non controversial, although 
not always well understood in political and even policy circles. In a recent 
meta-analysis study involving the evidence collected in many previous 
studies, Gomez-Reino and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) conclude that educa­
tion, urban transportation, garbage collection and water and sanitation, in 
that order, are the services that display the largest potential for economies 
of scale. Although the theoretical case that the presence of economies 
of scale should lead to less fragmentation is a solid one, the available 
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empirical evidence on this link is quite scarce. Nevertheless the real, or 
otherwise perceived, presence of substantial economies of scale has led 
to important policy decisions involving the forced amalgamation of local 
governments in a large number of countries, many of them in Europe. 
These policies by themselves offer some sort of an exogenous link between 
economies of scale and jurisdictional fragmentation. However, analytical 
evidence on this link between economies of scale and fragmentation is very 
scarce or non-existent. This, we believe, is due to the difficulties of meas­
uring economies of scale in a sample of countries, which may be the best 
setting to explore the importance of this phenomenon versus other forces 
as determinants of fragmentation. The difficulties of measuring economies 
of scale consistently across countries are addressed below in the discussion 
of our empirical model. 
Economies of scope and demands for local accountability 
A second major tradeoff critical in the definition of the optimal juris­
dictional size is that between administrative costs and local government 
accountability.5 If economies of scope are present, the joint delivery, for 
example, of solid waste collection and water services by a supra-local level 
of government offers cost savings over their separate provision by two 
or more local governments. This consolidation of services would reduce 
fragmentation but it may also decrease accountability of governments 
to citizens. Evidence of economies of scope exists, especially for private 
sector production, but it is scant with reference to local government pro­
duction processes. Sharing production inputs was shown to be a source of 
scope economies in the health care services sector (Grosskopf et al., 1995; 
Dollery and Fleming, 2006). Equally, Callan and Thomas (2001), in their 
estimation of a multi-product cost function for municipal waste services, 
find evidence of significant cost savings from the joint provision of recy­
cling and disposal services; whereas Wolff (2004) argues that substantial 
economies of scope are found in the integrated management of river basin 
systems in the U.S., as opposed to functional specialization. Although 
scarce, this empirical evidence extends across very different local govern­
ment services, providing some grounds to expect lower fragmentation of 
government due to the cost savings offered by joint production. 
Can demand for greater political accountability lead to higher frag­
mentation? Several dimensions of the concept of political accountability 
need to be distinguished. We may define political accountability as the 
voters' capacity to influence the election (and actions) of their local repre­
sentatives (Seabright, 1996). Such ability is expected to affect the political 
responsiveness to local preferences in the mix of public goods and services 
provided. This responsiveness is largely dependent on fiscal authority 
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aspects such as whether powers to spend and tax have been devolved 
to subnational governments. It also depends on whether elections are 
being held at the subnational tiers of government and on the quality of 
the election systems. Thus, for heterogeneous preferences to lead to dis­
tinguishable mixes of public goods provided across jurisdictions, certain 
institutional foundations must be in place linking citizens with policy 
makers. 
The expected greater responsiveness of representatives from smaller -
more fragmented - jurisdictions to the preferences of their constituents 
is not an aspect explored by Oates in the theory of optimal jurisdictional 
size. His model is anchored in a "direct democracy system", whereby local 
citizens "vote" effectively on the level of public good to be provided. 
If representative democracy models are the setting for public good 
provision, then the principal-agent aspects of the relationship between 
constituents and representatives come into play. In this regard, Tommasi 
and Weinschelbaum (1999) identify four channels through which smaller 
jurisdictions are able to exert improved control over their political rep­
resentatives (and thus ensure their priorities are acted upon). First, in 
line with Olson's (1965) theory of collective action, smaller jurisdictions 
reduce the incentives to free-riding (which is rendered more visible in 
smaller groups). Second, the existence of yardstick competition introduces 
additional benchmarks for political performance not easy to manipulate 
by local representatives. Linked to this aspect, policy diffusion models 
(Berry and Berry, 1990) would argue that local experimentation and the 
diffusion of best practices across jurisdictions may also introduce incen­
tives and benchmarks for government performance. A third channel is 
the fact that physical proximity to local representatives allows easier 
access to them (i.e. reduced transaction costs) even when demands are not 
related to policy changes but simply to quick, expedited action on issues of 
citizens' interest.6 In a game theoretic setting, physical proximity increases 
the probability of interacting in multiple venues, which allows for oppor­
tunities for punishment (Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 1999) and thus 
introduces incentives for politicians to comply with citizens' demands.7 
It is important to distinguish among these possible determinants of juris­
dictional fragmentation if we attempt to explain the mounting anecdotal 
evidence of citizens' resistance to jurisdictional consolidation in the pres­
ence of nearly identical preferences for public goods and certain potential 
for economies of scale. 
These aspects may be more important than any perceived gains on the 
(statistical) importance of individual votes in smaller jurisdictions. Even 
in small constituencies, the probability that a single vote will be decisive 
is minute.8 
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Such demand for political accountability may not even translate into 
greater citizen participation in government, even though proximity to 
representatives may reduce the cost of collecting information about local 
policies. Although direct citizen involvement in participatory planning, 
budgeting or evaluation process may not depend on the level of govern­
ment analyzed, the use of citizen satisfaction surveys does seem to assist 
budget development processes (Jordan and Hackbart, 1999; Melkers and 
Willoughby, 2005), informing governments' decisions on new expenditure 
programs (Riverbank and Kelly, 2006). Along those lines, there seems to 
be substantial evidence from international surveys that residents show 
higher levels of satisfaction from the services received from local gov­
ernments than those received from the central government (CIS, several 
years, or Dasgupta et al. (2009) for the case of Indonesia). 
The literature on performance budgeting provides an alternative avenue 
to explore how accountable and responsive local governments are to 
citizens' preferences and whether size affects the level of accountability. 
By explicitly defining indicators and performance benchmarks in their 
budgets, governments not only change the technology of accountability, 
but may offer a critical instrument to evaluate how close government 
actions are to local preferences. A recent review of the literature by Gomez 
and Willoughby (2008) shows that the widespread implementation of 
performance budgeting measures at different levels of government in the 
U.S. does not seem to have translated into significant changes in inter- or 
intra-sectoral allocation. This may reflect a lack of flexibility in adjust­
ing expenditure patterns to local preferences due to largely committed, 
politics-driven budgets, or simply that actual budgets may be closer to 
what is desirable. But, it could also be a reflection of how time-consuming 
it is for citizens to collect and process government budgetary information 
and act upon it. In this direction, Melkers and Willoughby (2001) found 
that in the U.S., budget officials at the state level were more positive about 
the impact of results-based budgeting on states' budgetary appropriations 
if the performance measurement was a requirement of the legislature (and 
not just of the executive). 
Thus far there is no clear evidence that the impact of performance meas­
urement on budget formulation is different - one would expect larger - for 
lower tiers in the government hierarchy (Melkers and Willoughby, 2005). 
These authors find, again for the U.S., that the use of performance meas­
ures is more common at the county than at the municipal level. However, 
they warn that this cannot be taken as an indication that smaller govern­
ments are less accountable to their citizens. In fact, the opposite may be 
possible, that the higher accountability of smaller governments lowers the 
need for the implementation of performance measures. 
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Summarizing, the evidence so far on economies of scope is largely 
concentrated in the area of private sector production processes. At this 
point there is no solid evidence on a relation between jurisdiction size and 
budgetary processes, including higher citizen participation. 
Equity and fragmentation in local government structure 
In the absence of proper fiscal equalization mechanisms, fragmentation of 
the local government structure may make the delivery of public services 
less equitable (Warner and Hefetz, 2002). In addition, a commonly shared 
hypothesis is that fiscal fragmentation may be favored as a strategy to 
avoid inter-jurisdictional redistribution of local fiscal bases (Ellickson, 
1971; Lewis, 1998). On the other hand, government fragmentation may 
allow for better access of the poor and rural population to services tailored 
to their needs, thus making the system of government more equitable. 
Academic contributions to this debate have focused on the analysis 
of metropolitan areas and especially on the fiscal comparison between 
central metropolitan and suburban areas, mostly in the U.S. As Razin 
(2000; p. 28) puts it, changes in local government organization "re-shape 
the rules of the game of local development and influence inter-local dis­
parities". However, Schneider (1986), in his study of metropolitan dis­
parities in access to services, does not find support for the hypothesis that 
fragmentation results in higher service inequality; Morgan and Mareschal 
(1999) do not find either any effect of metropolitan fragmentation on 
fiscal health. 
Fragmentation and institutional, demographic, and geographical issues 
Certain institutional aspects that may affect (restrict or encourage) further 
local government fragmentation have been explored in the empirical liter­
ature. Nelson (1992), focusing on the U.S. case, finds that tax and expendi­
ture limitations (TELs) increase the number of special districts, which 
may be created as a way to circumvent tax limits imposed upon state and 
local governments via referendum. However, he does not find evidence 
that other self-imposed limits to local debt or home rule clauses have any 
significant impact on fragmentation.9 However, contrary to Nelson's 
findings, Bowler and Donovan (2004; p. 194) most recently qualified this 
finding, arguing that, "absent the pressure of ballot initiatives, TELs do 
not lead (in the U.S.) to an increase in the formation of new local govern­
ments". In the same vein, Lewis (1998) argues that the implementation of 
Proposition 13, which imposed severe limits to the rise of property taxes 
in California, did not lead to an increase in the level of local government 
fragmentation in the form of additional special districts. 
The impact of the overall size of the public sector on fragmentation has 
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not been fully explored in the literature, in part perhaps due to the endog-
eneity involved in its testing. On the other hand, the form of financing does 
appear to have an effect on fragmentation. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) find 
that state aid to school districts was an important determinant of the great 
consolidation of school districts observed between 1950 and 1980 in the 
U.S. A larger role of the state in the financing of local schools reduced the 
capacity of districts to differentiate the education services provided and to 
sort themselves on the basis of average income in their jurisdictions. 
Outside the main economic arguments, jurisdictional fragmentation 
may also be affected by a myriad of institutional features such as the form 
of the state (federal versus unitary), a history of decentralized govern­
ment or secession of certain regions, cultural and ethnic issues, civil or 
armed conflicts, and so on. But to date no empirical research has been 
done on these issues. More recently, and particularly with regard to urban 
municipal consolidation processes, the desire to compete in a "global city" 
environment may be affecting metropolitan consolidation processes.10 
On the other hand, demographic and geographical variables have tra­
ditionally been used as controls in the empirical analysis of local govern­
ment fragmentation. Metro area population and land area are positively 
correlated and statistically significant determinants of the number of 
governments in Nelson (1992), a result partially supported in Bowler and 
Donovan (2004). The hypothesis behind the inclusion of these variables 
is that large demographic or geographical areas may be more difficult to 
manage and thus fragmentation would be efficiency enhancing. Nelson's 
analysis includes additionally U.S.-specific institutional explanatory 
variables not necessarily applicable to cross-country analysis.11 
In summary, as we have reviewed in this section, numerous factors may 
play a role explaining the level of government fragmentation encountered 
in a particular country. Our challenge is now to develop an empirical 
model that allows exploration of the relative influence of these explanatory 
variables, a task approached in the next section. 
4. HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The prevailing theory on optimal government size implies that the number 
of jurisdictions is a function of several factors, including importantly 
the cost of production of services (and thus the potential for economies 
of scale), the heterogeneity of preferences, and preferences for political 
accountability. All other things equal, optimal jurisdictional size is smaller 
when preferences for political accountability are taken into account. In 
addition, we have discussed additional determinants of jurisdictional 
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fragmentation, including institutional, geographical and demographic 
variables. 
Generically, we can represent the relationship between optimal jurisdic­
tional size and this set of relevant variables as: 
N = N(C, U(DG), P, Z), 
where N is the jurisdictional size, C represents a measure of economies of 
scale, U(DG) depicts the level of heterogeneity of preferences, P represents 
preferences for political accountability and Z is a vector including other 
institutional, geographic and demographic factors affecting jurisdictional 
size. 
As discussed in previous sections, the expected sign of the partial 
derivatives is as follows: 
dN „ dN n AN „ — > 0, — < 0, and — < 0 
dC dU dP 
Our first task in the definition of our empirical model is to further 
clarify our dependent variable. As already noted above, operationalizing 
the level of government fragmentation is a complex task. The literature 
has favored absolute measures, such as the total number of governments, 
over scaling indicators, such as the average population or geographical 
area by jurisdiction. Conversely, the number of local governments for a 
certain population size could be used as a relative measure of fragmenta­
tion. In his study of U.S. government fragmentation, Nelson (1992) uses 
the number of governments per metro area, while Bowler and Donovan 
(2004) use the number of governments (again both general and special-
purpose governments) in a state at the time of a census. In exploring the 
effect on fragmentation of Proposition 13 in California (which impor­
tantly limited revenue collections from the property tax), Lewis (1998) also 
uses total number of governments as his variable of interest. 
The use of absolute measures of government fragmentation (i.e. total 
number of governments) may be a reasonable empirical strategy when 
a certain level of jurisdictional homogeneity can be assumed within the 
sample, as in country case-studies. Our aim however is to explore these 
relationships within the context of as large as possible a sample of coun­
tries. This therefore requires a relative measure of fragmentation that 
helps homogenize to the extent possible the individual values of our 
dependent variable. 
First, we should clarify what is understood as "government" or juris­
diction in this context. In short, we include in our estimations all levels 
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of government with service delivery responsibilities and all jurisdictions 
within each level. The rationale behind this selection is that we are inter­
ested in exploring whether heterogeneity of preferences for public services 
may lead to further fragmentation in order to allow a better matching of 
preferences with service delivery. Arguably, a country may be divided into 
a large number of jurisdictions, but in the absence of elected governments 
with some authority over their budgets, public service delivery may not 
differ much in that system from a fully centralized service delivery system. 
The level of discretion or authority over local expenditure and revenue 
sources is in reality very hard to measure. In fact, fiscal decentralization 
experts around the world have identified this as a major obstacle in the 
analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, 
quality of service delivery, and so on. Acknowledging that the level of 
fiscal autonomy of subnational government around the world varies 
widely, it is to be expected that a jurisdiction with a locally elected govern­
ment will have larger authority over its budget than a similar territorial 
unit with de-concentrated units of the central government. Accordingly, 
our analysis will attempt to control for this. 
Our estimation strategy is to try different specifications of the dependent 
variable. First, in line with previous contributions to the literature, we will 
use the total number of jurisdictions (from elected levels of government) 
as our dependent variable. In addition, as just discussed, the heterogeneity 
of jurisdictions and different sizes across the world requires the use of a 
relative indicator of fragmentation that allows homogenizing the values of 
our dependent variable. Thus, in the subsequent model specifications we 
will use as dependent variables the ratios of population and area size to the 
total number of jurisdictions. To that end, all jurisdictions from elected 
levels of government (including the central government) are added, and 
the values of the above mentioned ratios are calculated for each country. 
Lastly, we will also include in our estimations the number of levels 
of government. This is an aspect of jurisdictional fragmentation that 
has been largely ignored in the literature, and thus we provide a first 
exploration into this issue. 
The Difficulties of Measuring Economies of Scale in a Sample of Countries 
In line with the standard model of optimal jurisdictional size, we would 
expect the potential for economies of scale to be, other things equal, a 
deterrent to high government fragmentation.12 The literature has tradi­
tionally approximated the measurement of economies of scale in various 
ways. Earlier studies used population as a proxy for economies of scale, 
while more recent contributions have used either expenditure or produc­
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tion cost data. As shown in the meta-analysis results in Gomez-Reino 
and Martinez-Vazquez (2011), using population as a measure of potential 
economies of scale can lead to their underestimation. 
In the context of our analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation, using 
population as our measure of economies of scale introduces additional 
problems. For example, considering China and Luxembourg side by side, 
we would have to expect (if population as our proxy for economies of 
scale) lower relative levels of government fragmentation in China than 
in Luxembourg, since China's large population would signal the largest 
international potential for economies of scale. That is, obviously, not a 
reasonable assumption. Population would seem to be therefore naturally 
and directly related to the level of jurisdictional fragmentation, and it is 
discarded as a valid proxy for economies of scale. This approach is also 
consistent with Nelson's (1992) analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation in 
metropolitan areas of the U.S., whereby population is included solely as 
an environmental control variable. 
Given the existence of economies of scale in services such as urban trans­
portation, garbage collection or water and sanitation, ideally, one would 
want to explore the functional assignments of our sample of countries and 
ascertain in which of them these functions are decentralized to subnational 
levels of government as an indication of potential for economies of scale. 
Regrettably, few countries have formal statements of expenditure assign­
ments and even where they exist, they are often no more than broad lists 
of functional responsibilities with great overlap across tiers of govern­
ment. In addition, collecting data on the cost elasticity of production from 
service delivery at subnational levels of government for a sample of close 
to 200 countries is, simply, unrealistic. 
We are left with few straightforward options for variables approximat­
ing the potential for economies of scale in public service delivery. The most 
comprehensive analysis of the determinants of fragmentation in the U.S. 
by Nelson (1992) does not include a measure of economies of scale, a clear 
signal of the difficulties encountered in operationalizing this variable even 
in the context of a single country case-study. The Global Competitiveness 
Index (Schwab, 2010) may offer a possible avenue. Among the index sub­
components, a measure of technological readiness is included. Since the 
sources of economies of scale are mostly of a technological nature, they 
may originate in gains from more efficient division of labor (internal econ­
omies of scale), or can be derived from an expansion in the industry where 
the company operates, leading to increased leverage power with suppliers. 
Economies of scale may also be due to the use of more specialized inputs 
of production. The latter technological dimension is measured by the GCI 
technological readiness sub-index, which evaluates the capacity of an 
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economy to adopt new technologies in order to improve the productivity 
of the national private sector.13 The use of this measure implies assuming 
that if such technologies are available to the private sector, it would be 
more likely that the public sector is also introducing them in its production 
processes, thus increasing their productivity.14 But we must note that even 
in this case the direction on optimal scale is not necessarily clear; in partic­
ular, the introduction of technological advances may allow cost reductions 
even in specialized production, thus making possible the efficient delivery 
of public services at smaller scales. 
Allowing for Heterogeneous Preferences 
The second set of variables aims to test the hypothesis that heterogeneous 
preferences lead to greater jurisdictional fragmentation. This hypoth­
esis is derived from Oates's standard postulate that greater preference 
heterogeneity leads to smaller optimal group size for service delivery. 
Heterogeneous preferences have been operationalized in practice via meas­
ures of income, race, and age dispersion. In terms of income dispersion, 
higher values of the Gini income inequality index should lead to diverse 
preferences and thus to a higher level of jurisdictional fragmentation. 
Equally, a measure of ethnic dispersion (taking into consideration race, 
language, and religious dimensions) has been used to approximate het­
erogeneous preferences derived from varying ethnic compositions.15 Greater 
ethnic diversity is also expected to translate into a more fragmented govern­
ment system that can reflect the preferences of the minorities. First, we use 
the data in a recent contribution by Alesina et al. (2003), which provides 
recalculated measures of the Easterly and Levine (1997) data on disaggre­
gated indexes of fractionalization. To conduct a sensitivity analysis, we also 
construct our own Herfindahl ethnic and linguistic fractionalization index on 
the basis of data on ethnic composition collected from population statistics 
(Table 2.2). Both indexes are highly correlated and their alternative inclusion 
in the model estimations renders no significant differences in the results. 
We also include an additional measure of heterogeneity of preferences 
as an index of age dispersion. The rationale behind it is that senior citizens 
may be assumed to display differentiated sets of preferences (e.g., they may 
favor higher expenditure in health and lower expenditure in education as 
they do not have school-age children).16 
Measuring Political Accountability 
Our variable of interest, political accountability, is operationalized in 
various forms. The existence of elected government representatives at the 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Variable name Max Min Mean 
AHV 0.67 0.46 0.51 
AleELF 0.93 0.00 0.44 
AleLin 0.92 0.00 0.39 
AleRel 0.86 0.00 0.44 
Country 16,995,800 2.00 597,974 
area 
Gini 74.61 24.00 40.88 
Conlneq 1.00 0.00 
GDPpc 85,382 298 13,259 
VAI 4.07 0.19 2.49 
Standard Obs. Description Source 
deviation 
Year 
0.03 218 Age Hertindahl country value 
0.26 187 Ethno linguistic Alesinaetal. 2003 
fractionalization 
Herfindahl index 
0.28 192 Language Alesinaetal. 2003 
fractionalization 
index 
0.23 202 Religion Alesina et al. 2003 
fractionalization 
index 
1,774,385 218 Total country International 
area in square km Database, US Census 
Bureau 
9.91 151 Income/ U.N. Wider Several 
expenditure Database Years 
inequality 
151 Dummy variable with value 1 for 
consumption inequality data 
15,704 182 Purchasing power United 2007 
parity GDP data Nations 
HDR 
1.00 205 Voice and World Bank 2007 
accountability 
index 
GEI 4.91 0.15 2.48 
SubDem 2 0.00 1.1 
Status 
SubDem 0.00 7 5.08 
Status2 
Finite term 1 0.00 0.894 
1.00 
0.882 
2.93 
0.308 
209 
190 
171 
170 
Government 
effectiveness 
index 
Interaction term: 
Subnational 
elections 
•Democratic 
status . 
(0=dictatorship, 
1 =pseudo 
democracy, 
2=electoral 
democracy) 
Interaction term: 
subnational 
elections *Index 
of legislative 
competitiveness 
(0=no legislature 
-7=multiple 
parties have seats 
in parliament) 
Existence of a 
finite term for the 
legislature 
World Bank 
Own 
calculations 
2007 
2009 
World Bank 
and own 
calculations 
2006 
World Bank 2006 
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subnational levels of government (as opposed to appointed by central 
government authorities) can be taken as a critical indicator of political 
accountability since subnational officials can be removed from office if 
their policies do not reflect the needs and preferences of the majority. 
However, the existence of subnational elections is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for true accountability to be present. Several pseudo-
democracies and even dictatorships around the world hold subnational 
"elections". In these countries, the range of candidates is severely limited 
to those of the party in power or political allies, and no credible political 
alternatives are offered to citizens. To take into account the democratic 
status of countries around the world, we interact our dummy variable 
measuring the presence of subnational elections with an index of legis­
lative competitiveness from the Political Institutions Database (World 
Bank, 2006). 
In addition, we include in our model the World Bank's Governance 
Index sub-component of "voice and accountability". This indicator (with 
a minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 5) aims to measure the "extent 
to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of 
governments" (Kaufmann et al., 2008). The governance indicators col­
lected by the World Bank include an additional indicator, "Government 
Effectiveness", which aims to measure the capacity of subnational 
bureaucracies to provide quality public services and its independence from 
political pressures. Both measures cover aspects of our variable of interest 
(political accountability) and offer the opportunity to reduce the endo-
geneity of the model by using them as a proxy for the latter. Arguably, 
the "voice and accountability" indicator represents more closely citizens' 
capacity to elect and exercise control over their political class, the very 
essence of accountability. 
A third dimension of accountability that is explored is the authority 
of local representatives over tax collection and spending policies. It may 
be the case that local authorities are elected but still budgets are "condi­
tional" in their use, so that in reality no spending discretion is allowed. 
Additionally, local authorities may not enjoy revenue raising autonomy, 
which would also limit their ability to respond to local needs. We measure 
this dimension in two ways. First, we include a variable measuring the 
share of total expenditure conducted at the subnational level, a traditional 
indicator of fiscal decentralization. Second, we include a dummy vari­
able with a value of 1 if the subnational governments have authority over 
taxing, spending or legislating (World Bank, 2006). Unfortunately, this 
variable is only available for a limited number of countries, reducing the 
number of observations importantly. 
We also consider other variables that may influence the level of 
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jurisdictional fragmentation. One such variable is the share of public 
expenditure in GDP. However, this variable presents a clear problem of 
endogeneity, as more fragmented systems of government are also more 
likely to show a higher government share in GDP (Martinez-Vazquez and 
Yao, 2009). Therefore this variable was not used in our final model speci­
fication. A second variable is the existence of constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing the provision of social services as a right of the citizenry 
(with obvious fiscal and governmental implications) which may affect the 
level of public sector expenditure and potential fragmentation. In the end 
we were not able to code the information for the large number of countries 
in our sample from the available constitutional texts in English. 
Additional Institutional Hypotheses 
An array of institutional variables may also affect the level of fragmen­
tation of a country. The available data on political institutions offers 
interesting alternatives for testing the role of institutions on jurisdictional 
fragmentation. Arguably, the impact of institutional variables is likely to 
extend beyond any single year and, as such, a cross-sectional analysis for a 
single year will not capture the full implications of maintaining or chang­
ing any critical aspect of the institutional fabric of a country. Our results 
in this area should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
First, we test the impact of presidential electoral arrangements (presi­
dential, parliamentary or assembly elected president) on jurisdictional 
fragmentation. Second, we test whether the existence of a nationalistic 
party in power (arguably an advocate of unitary systems) may lead to 
lower levels of fragmentation.17 As additional tests to the quality of 
democracy, we introduce a variable measuring whether there is a constitu­
tional limit on the number of years an executive can serve before elections 
are called. Ideally, following Nelson (1992), we would have liked to 
include in our analysis whether provisions exist for minimum population 
sizes for new jurisdiction creation. We were unable to collect this variable 
for a large enough number of countries. 
Finally, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that movements from auto­
cratic to democratic systems of government release pent up pressure for 
jurisdictional fragmentation. Indonesia may be a good example where the 
advent of democracy unleashed a process of fragmentation (pemekaran) 
that translated into almost the doubling of subnational level jurisdictions 
supposedly in search of democratic spaces of representation (Imansyah 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2010). The end of armed conflicts may also lead 
to such a process of new jurisdiction formation. We measure these dimen­
sions with a single dummy variable with value one when a significant 
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transition to a more democratic system of government (measured by an 
increase in the Polity IV project index of 3 or more points) occurred in the 
country over the last 10 years. 
Geographic Control Variables 
Arguably, country size can affect the level of government fragmentation. 
Difficulties in reaching isolated populations from the political center are 
a strong incentive to create subnational levels of government that can be 
closer for the delivery of public services. We use country area (in square 
kilometers) to measure country size. Additionally, a measure of geo­
graphic accessibility is required, as countries with small land area may still 
be highly fragmented if they consist of mountainous territory or display 
other natural features that make accessibility difficult. Such lack of acces­
sibility should lead to a preference for smaller governments that can be 
closer to the citizens. Absent a better measure of accessibility, we use the 
ratio of the highest to the lowest altitude in a country as a proxy for acces­
sibility. Ideally, we would like to use many altitude points in every country 
to evaluate their dispersion, but such information could not be obtained. 
We consider alternative variables in order to control for the way geo­
graphical characteristics may affect jurisdictional fragmentation. First, 
we consider the geographical location of a country, such as whether it is 
landlocked or coastal, using a dummy variable to measure this dimension. 
Second, we include a variable denoting the continent where the country is 
located. And third, we test for the impact of latitude, a geographical vari­
able that has proved highly significant in previous economic analyses such 
as economic growth patterns. 
Estimation Methodology and Data 
Our estimation approach involves two stages. First, we approach the 
analysis of the determinants of the number of levels or tiers of govern­
ment in a given country. Second, we test the different hypotheses on the 
determinants of jurisdictional fragmentation within single levels. 
The rationale for such an approach is the understanding that, although 
certain simultaneity in the process of determination of the two stages is 
obvious, if presented with the opportunity to define the territorial struc­
ture of a country (for instance at the time of drafting the constitution), we 
would expect the logical sequential order of events to be first to define the 
number of tiers of government and, given that, to determine the number 
of the mechanisms for the creation of new jurisdictions (or their merger) 
within each of those levels.18 
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As discussed in the previous section, the number of tiers of government 
in a given country is a largely unexplored dimension of jurisdictional frag­
mentation in the literature. By selecting the number of tiers of subnational 
levels of government as the dependent variable, we observe that while 
some countries have two tiers or even more, there are other countries that 
have only one tier or none. Thus Tobit estimation appears to be an ade­
quate estimation approach (Tobin, 1958). Because the variable is censored 
at 0, in its standard mathematical expression, in terms of a latent variable 
y* (Baum, 2006): 
where Xjis a row vector of explanatory variables, p is a vector of param­
eters to be estimated, and p ~ N(0,1) is the error term. 
In our sample, this variable either shows zeros for those countries with 
no subnational levels of government or a positive integer between 1 and 4. 
Arguably, there are other alternatives to operationalize this aspect of juris­
dictional fragmentation. For instance, we could have collapsed all positive 
values and turned this censored variable into a binary one, but at the cost 
of losing important information on the different number of tiers of sub-
national governments. Alternatively, we could have counted all levels of 
government in the variable, including the central one, thus allowing for 
the use of an ordered probit model fit, an alternative maximum likelihood 
estimation method. However, the cardinal nature of the variable in the 
ordered probit estimation suggests that this is a less preferred approach.19 
Last, truncated data estimation methods were deemed not appropriate 
since the data generation process did not present this characteristic. We 
also could perhaps convert the variable into a truncated one by discarding 
all observations with a value of zero (Baum, 2006), but again at the cost of 
degrees of freedom and loss of information. 
In order to explore the determinants of the number of subnational tiers 
of governments across countries (which we believe a first in the literature), 
we estimate the following equation: 
where L is the number of levels of government, C, represents economies 
of scale, U, reflects the impact of heterogeneous preferences on overall 
welfare, P, is our measure of political accountability, and Z7 is a vector 
T* = A7P + p 
= f 0 ify*<= 0 
' >o { 
L, - a0 + P, Cj'+ P2 U, + p3 Pi + : 0, Zji + p, 
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of other institutional and geographical variables. The marginal effects 
on the observed value L can be obtained as the product of the individual 
coefficients times the probability that the latent variable value is between 
a certain interval. Our interpretation of the results will focus on the 
statistical significance of the coefficients and the direction (sign) of the 
relationships found. 
In the second stage of our estimation we turn to the analysis of the more 
conventional question of jurisdictional fragmentation: explaining the 
determinants of the number of jurisdictions, normalized or not by popula­
tion and land area. Here we use standard OLS estimation with three alter­
native dependent variables: the total number of jurisdictions, the average 
population per jurisdiction, and the average land area per jurisdiction. 
For simplicity, initially we assume a linear functional form for the basic 
specification: 
N = a0 + P,C, + M + (),/>, + 2* 0,Z,.,. + M-, 
where N is the number of jurisdictions (or the average population or area 
per jurisdiction, depending on the specification), C, represents economies 
of scale, U, reflects the impact of heterogeneous preferences on overall 
welfare, P( is our measure of political accountability, and Z/7 is a vector of 
other institutional and geographical variables. 
At the outset, and considering the multiple avenues through which the 
levels of fragmentation of a country can be determined, our model may 
leave out, due to lack of available data, critical explanatory variables 
and thus suffer from omitted variable bias that leads to higher stand­
ard errors. To explore this aspect we will conduct standardized Ramsey 
tests. Moreover, the size of our sample (effectively around 143 observa­
tions) limits the number of variables that can be included in the analy­
sis. However, regional dummy variables are introduced to account for 
regional unobserved fixed effects on fragmentation patterns. 
In order to test for the appropriateness of the linearity assumption 
for the basic specification, we plot the residuals against the suggested 
predictors in early model specifications to explore for possible deviations 
from linearity. This analysis suggests the need to transform several of 
the variables into logarithmic form, and to opt for a quadratic form in the 
relationship between population and jurisdictional fragmentation. 
Both the White and Breusch-Pagan tests showed a certain amount of 
heteroskedasticity as was to be expected from the nature of our cross-
section sample. Accordingly, robust standard errors are calculated to 
correct the heteroskedastic errors. 
Summary statistics and sources for the data used in this analysis are 
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provided in Table 2.2. The data have been collected from a wide variety of 
sources for a cross-section of around 200 countries. 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We now turn to the analysis of the results for the two sets of estimations. 
Tiers of Government 
The results of the estimation for the number of subnational tiers using 
maximum likelihood estimation for the Tobit regression model are pre­
sented in Table 2.3. From our results, it would appear that the vertical 
structure of government (number of tiers) might be solely related to "size" 
variables, with other institutional and preference-related variables playing 
no distinctive role. In particular, we find a strong positive relationship 
between population and fragmentation, defined as the number of subna­
tional tiers of government. Equally, a large country area seems to increase 
the probability of having more subnational levels of government. Both 
results are robust to the different model specifications, even after regional 
dummy variables are included. 
Of the set of variables measuring heterogeneity of preferences, it would 
not seem that any of them plays a significant role in this aspect of frag­
mentation. Nor could we find any significant relationship between our 
set of institutional variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, etc., and the 
number of tiers of subnational government. Geographical fixed effects, as 
captured partly by the regional dummies, show countries in other conti­
nents than Europe to have a lower probability, all other things equal, of 
vertical fragmentation. 
Number of Governments 
The estimation for three alternative measures of jurisdictional fragmen­
tation (total number of jurisdictions, population average and area size 
average per jurisdiction) are presented in Table 2.4. For each of these 
variables, we estimate three sets of model specifications. 
In the first one (Models 1, 4 and 7 respectively), we test the standard eco­
nomic hypotheses of fragmentation based on the impact of economies of 
scale and of heterogeneity of preferences in the level of jurisdictional frag­
mentation. For this first set of models, we run Ramsey tests to search for 
possible omitted variable bias.20 In addition, significant correlation was 
found among some variables (especially different model specifications, 
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Table 2.3 Results from the Tobit model for tiers of government 
Dep. variable: number of subnational levels of government 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Population .091** .086** .092** 
(.041) (.042) (.042) 
Area .064** .060* .055* 
(.031) (.031) (.029) 
AleELF -.361 -.364 -.281 
(.224) (.228) (.229) 
Gini -.004 -.004 .006 
(.005) (.005) (.006) 
Conlneq .144 .141 .196 
(139) (.145) (.165) 
GDPpc -.058 -.048 -.049 
(.058) (.063) (.062) 
AHV -.024 .188 .022 
(1.785) (1.894) (1.817) 
Subnational elections* .006 .001 
Dem status 2 (.021) (.022) 
VA1 -.037 -.084 
(.057) (.058) 
Oceania -.089 
(.183) 
South America -.383* 
(.205) 
Central America -.535*** 
(.157) 
North America -.684*** 
(.217) 
Asia -.386** 
(.174) 
Africa -.379 
(.213) 
Constant .673 .682 .733 
(1.221) (1.269) (1.192) 
Number of observations 144 141 141 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1358 0.1259 0.1684 
Log pseudo-likelihood -114.65 -113.25 -107.75 
Sigma .536 .540 .519 
(.034) (.033) (.034) 
Probability > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: 
MLE estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Population, GDPpc 
and Area are in logarithmic form. Europe is the reference group for the regional dummy 
variables. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
Table 2.4 Results from the OLS estimation for the number ofjurisdictions 
Dep. variable: log of total number Dep. variable: log of area to Dep. variable: log of population 
of jurisdictions jurisdictions ratio to jurisdictions ratio 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Population .020*** .021*** .019*** -.006** -.006** -.006* 
(millions) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Population -.1X10"*** -.1X10"*** -.1X10"*** 0.04X10"* 0.04X10"* 0.04X10"* 
squared (0.02X10") (0.02x10") (0.02X10") (0.02x10") (0.02X10") (0.02X10") 
Area .384*** .266*** .292*** -.015 .017 .026 
(.061) (.060) (.057) (.055) (054) (.059) 
AleELF -1.899*** -1.380** -1.392** 2.851*** 2.553*** 2.251*** 1.178 .826 .884 
(.583) (.539) (.565) (.711) (.692) (.745) (.547) (.529) (.562) 
Gini -.024** -.024*** -.006 .033** .0362** .007 .013 .017 .003 
(.011) (.009) (.011) (015) (.014) (.016) (.011) (.012) (.015) 
Conlneq -.235 -.407 -.211 .166 .141 -.056 .157 .241 .026 
(.279) (.250) (.273) (.345) (.323) (.348) (.275) (.247) (.264) 
GDPpc -.140 -.249** -.324*** .181 .401** .413* -.062 .071 .187 
(.146) (.128) (.138) (.192) (.186) (212) (.139) (.137) (.146) 
AHV -4.590 -6.348 -5.529 -11.641* -14.552** -11.792 2.635 3.932 4.362 
(4.513) (4.095) (4.317) (6.507) (7.041) (7.119) (4.474) (4.177) (4.281) 
Subnational .145*** .137*** -.132** -.123** -.143*** -.128*** -.143*** 
elections* (.035) (.038) (.055) (.059) (.037) (.041) (.037) 
Dem 
status 2 
VAI .118 .099 -.333** -.333* -.116 -.072 -.116 
(.121) (.127) (.157) (.170) (.133) (.131) (-133) 
Sub levels 907*** .806*** -.238 -.235 -.427** -.357* 
1 * * 
(.199) (.201 ) (.198) (.203) (.195) (.204) (.195) 
Oceania -1.531*** 2.614*** .789** 
(.387) (.822) (.382) 
South -.875** 1.892*** .677 
America (.431) (.521) (.492) 
Central -.805*** .305 .724* 
America (.369) (.565) (.396) 
North .206 .856 -.598 
America (.713) (.728) (.751) 
Asia -.568 .701 .794* 
(.388) (.572) (.417) 
Africa -.935** 1.229** .948* 
(.442) (.624) (.498) 
Constant 1.553 6.131** 6.208** 7.949** -4.936 -3.118 8.569*** 8.362*** 6.724** 
(2.467) (2.762) (2.841) (3.612) (4.137) (4.236) (3.067) (2.958) (2.941) 
Number of 144 141 141 144 141 141 144 141 141 
observa­
tions 
0.28 R-squared 0.58 0.67 0.71 0.26 0.31 0.39 0.13 0.23 
Probability > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 
OLS estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. GDPpc and Area in logarithmic form. Europe is the reference group for the 
regional dummy variables. 
»**. *», and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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both in terms of their size and signs, so no further attention was given 
to this issue. We also applied the Breusch-Pagan test to our initial model 
specification, with the results suggesting the presence of a certain amount 
of heteroskedasticity (confirmed by the plotting of residuals against some 
of the quasi-ordinal variables in the sample, such as subnational demo­
cratic status). As a result, our final estimations calculated and reported 
robust standard errors. 
The second set of specifications (Models 2, 5 and 8 respectively) includes 
proxy variables attempting to measure demand for political accountabil­
ity. From the basic theoretical framework we anticipate that, all things 
equal, demand for political accountability should translate into a smaller 
optimal jurisdictional size, and thus lead to higher fragmentation. Finally, 
in the third set of specifications (Models 3, 6 and 9 respectively) we add a 
vector of geographical and institutional control variables meant to test the 
robustness of the findings. 
Note that none of the specifications in Table 2.4 includes a variable for 
economies of scale. Regrettably, "technological readiness", the proxy for 
potential for economies of scale, proved to be insignificant and did not 
add to the overall explanatory power of the models; therefore the vari­
able was discarded from the final specifications. As previously discussed, 
the difficulties in appropriately measuring this potential dimension of 
fragmentation seem insurmountable at this time.21 Of course, absent the 
direct measurement of economies of scale, the variation in the level of 
jurisdictional fragmentation across countries due to the different potential 
for economies of scale is left in the error term, reducing the explanatory 
power of the model and possibly biasing our estimates for the role by other 
variables of interest. Note, however, that these effects may be minimized 
to the extent that economies of scale are technologically driven and that 
technology may be similarly available across countries. 
In terms of the remaining set of hypotheses, we are still able to draw 
important conclusions, as outlined in what follows. First, the results in 
Table 2.4 show that, as expected, population and land area are positively 
correlated with the level of jurisdictional fragmentation across countries. 
In addition, the impact of population appears to follow a non-linear 
pattern. Higher population leads to increasing levels of fragmentation, but 
at a decreasing rate. This relationship holds both for absolute measures 
of fragmentation (total number of jurisdictions) or relative ones (ratio of 
area to number of jurisdictions). The maximum level of fragmentation is 
reached at a population level of around I billion people, a level that only 
India and China have reached. An alternative model specification was 
tested whereby population was included as an explanatory variable in the 
model in a logarithmic (as opposed to quadratic) form. The estimation 
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of this specification showed that a 1 percent increase in population led 
to a 0.68 percent increase in the total number of jurisdictions, a less than 
proportional increase. The relationship between area and fragmentation 
is equally significant. A 1 percent increase in country area leads to a 0.3 
percent increase in the total number of jurisdictions in the full model speci­
fication. In summary, the level of fragmentation is inelastic with respect to 
population and land area, and more so for the latter than for the former. 
The set of variables measuring heterogeneity of preferences also offers 
statistically significant and sizable results. Our measure of ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation suggests, perhaps counter-intuitively, that greater disper­
sion on ethnic and linguistic groups leads to lower jurisdictional frag­
mentation, both in terms of smaller number of jurisdictions and higher 
average area. The result is-.very robust across model specifications and 
to alternative measurements of ethno-linguistic fragmentation. A pos­
sible explanation for this result is that ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
is more prevalent in poorer, low-growth countries with lower quality of 
government (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Also Aghion et al. (2002) find 
that ethnic fractionalization is inversely related to quality of democracy. 
It would follow then that countries with lower quality of government (less 
democratic societies) and high ethno-linguistic fractionalization would be 
less likely to create spaces for democratic representation with new juris­
dictions. However, these are aspects which we already control for in our 
model, so we are left wanting an alternative explanation. Perhaps ethno-
linguistic fragmentation historically leads to resistance against further 
fragmentation to preserve national or group identities. But at this stage we 
have no means to validate this conjecture. 
Our second variable approximating heterogeneous preferences, the age 
dispersion index, displays the hypothesized sign, but it is not robust across 
specifications. It would seem that greater age dispersion leads to a smaller 
average jurisdictional size, but we find no statistically significant evidence 
of the variable affecting the total number of jurisdictions or average popu­
lation size. This result may be due to the fact that age dispersion may not 
be that stable over time in each individual country. 
Two other variables with unanticipated results are per capita GDP and 
income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Our results indicate 
that higher per capita GDP leads to lower levels of fragmentation in the 
sample. Representation and democracy, as perhaps proxied by fragmenta­
tion, are expensive endeavors and one would anticipate that they exhibit 
a positive income elasticity, the opposite of what we find. However, the 
result may be explained in two different ways. First, to the extent that 
overall increases in per capita income tend to homogenize preferences for 
public services, this result may be a reasonable one to expect. Second, a 
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somewhat long list of countries have introduced forced local government 
amalgamation programs in recent times,22 and most of these countries 
tend to be countries with high GDP per capita. Second, the relationship 
between jurisdictional fragmentation and inequality shows that increases 
in inequality may lead to lower jurisdictional fragmentation overall; 
this is counter-intuitive to the extent that higher income groups may 
seek separation or fiscal protection through jurisdictional fragmentation. 
However, these results are not robust to the insertion of regional dummies 
in the model; certain world regions, such as Central America and South 
America, have notoriously unequal income distributions. 
Our variables approximating preferences for political accountability 
are significant and display the hypothesized sign. The interaction term 
formed by the existence of subnational elections and a measure of demo­
cratic status or legislative competitiveness proved to be significant and 
robust to different model specifications. The positive sign for this coef­
ficient indicates that increased demand for political accountability leads 
to higher jurisdictional fragmentation, both in terms of a greater number 
of jurisdictions or smaller average area per jurisdiction.23 The World Bank 
Voice and Accountability Index, a "measure of the extent to which citi­
zens are able to participate in the selection of governments", displayed the 
identical sign as the earlier measure of democratic quality but it was only 
statistically significant when average area per jurisdiction was selected as 
the dependent variable.24 
We explored several other avenues through which institutional aspects 
related to demand for political accountability could have impacted the 
level of jurisdictional fragmentation. First, we included the number of sub-
national levels of government as an additional explanatory variable. We 
may expect that more fragmentation - a larger number of jurisdictions - is 
likely to be found in countries with more tiers of government. The reason 
behind it is that intermediate levels of government are able to deliver serv­
ices to local or municipal governments unable to do so due to their small 
size. Lack of resort to such intermediate levels of government (i.e., county 
governments in the U.S., regional districts in British Columbia, or provin­
cial governments in Spain) would introduce incentives for local mergers, 
and thus reduce jurisdictional fragmentation. This relationship proved to 
be highly significant. As hypothesized, more levels of government led to 
an increase in the overall number of jurisdictions. The results, however, do 
not suggest that a similarly strong statistical relationship exists between 
the number of tiers of government and the average jurisdictional size in 
terms of population or land area. 
Second, we tested a set of several institutional aspects that may reason­
ably affect the level of fragmentation and that are proxies for democratic 
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quality. These included (1) the number of years of the executive in office 
(signal of quasi-democratic systems when its value exceeds 8); (2) the 
constitutional existence of a finite term in office before new elections are 
called; (3) whether a nationalist party is in power (more likely to advocate 
a less decentralized state and possibly a less fragmented one); and (4) the 
parliamentary system of the country. Of this set of variables, only the 
existence of a finite term in office seemed to significantly affect the total 
number of jurisdictions, but not their average size. 
Third, we introduced in the analysis several available indicators meas­
uring the size of the public sector in the GDP, the share of subnational 
expenditure over the national total, and a variable measuring whether 
fiscal authority existed over expenditure or tax policies at the local level 
(for which only 29 observations were available). We could not find sig­
nificant relationships between these variables and the level of jurisdic­
tional fragmentation and these variables were dropped from final model 
specifications. 
Finally, in order to partly account for country fixed effects, we intro­
duced regional dummy variables. Using Europe as the group of reference 
(arguably the most fragmented region together with North America), the 
dummy variables for other regions typically showed significantly lower 
levels of fragmentation. The inclusion of the regional dummies did not 
affect the estimates of our main variables for the different hypotheses and 
added importantly to the overall explanatory value of the model. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we use a large cross-section of countries to analyze the 
determinants of jurisdictional fragmentation along two dimensions: the 
number of tiers of government and the number and average size of all 
subnational government units. The analysis has allowed us to test the tra­
ditional hypotheses in the literature on optimal jurisdictional size related 
to the heterogeneity of preferences and economies of scale, and also the 
implications of preferences for political accountability. 
Overall, the vertical structure of government - the number of tiers of 
government - is mostly related to "size" variables and not to other insti­
tutional or preference-related aspects. Both population and land area size 
are positively related with the number of tiers of government in a country. 
This result is robust to all model specifications and dependent variables 
used as measures of fragmentation. 
One main additional finding from our analysis is that, in line with 
the predictions of our theoretical framework, preferences for political 
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accountability lead to smaller jurisdictional size and a larger number of 
governments. These results are robust across different model estimations. 
These results strongly suggest that accountability needs to be added to 
the list of critical dimensions in the theory of optimal jurisdictional size 
beyond the two arguments of economies of scale and heterogeneity of 
preferences emphasized in Oates's model. 
We also find strong evidence that a higher number of tiers of govern­
ment leads to overall higher jurisdictional fragmentation. We hypothesize 
that this is the case because when intermediate levels of government 
assume subsidiary responsibilities for local governments, the smaller local 
governments have less of an incentive to consolidate into larger jurisdic­
tions. This finding has immediate policy consequences for countries (like, 
for example, Spain) that are reconsidering the elimination of some tier 
of government (the province level in Spain) and are struggling with the 
administrative burdens and costs of highly fragmented local governments 
(with average size under 10,000 residents). 
In our empirical analysis we do less well in testing the validity of the 
two traditional arguments behind optimal jurisdiction size of economies 
of scale and heterogeneity of preferences. Despite the strong theoretical 
case, the set of variables used to approximate heterogeneous preferences 
lead to mixed results regarding the level of fragmentation. However, in 
some cases, although the variable proposed may certainly be reflective 
of heterogeneous preferences, other interfering variables may affect the 
causality of the relationship sought, as seems to be the case with ethno-
linguistic fragmentation. Of course, the results may also hide the inherent 
difficulty with measuring heterogeneous preferences correctly. More acute 
measuring difficulties have barred us altogether from testing the role of 
economies of scale in jurisdictional fragmentation. 
To conclude, we must note that our cross-sectional analysis is limited 
in several other respects. For example, many of the explanatory variables 
we use may actually exert their influence over the process of creation 
or merger of jurisdictions over time, and thus the observed influence is 
likely to depend on whether enough time has passed since the change in 
the explanatory variable. These processes could be observed in a panel 
dataset but remain hidden in cross-sectional analysis. Thus, ideally, 
future research will revisit many of the questions examined in this 
chapter using panel information. Our analysis underlines also the need 
to continue to explore new avenues for the measurement of economies of 
scale on subnational service delivery, a critical aspect that the empirical 
literature, including our contribution, has not yet been able to address 
adequately. 
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NOTES 
1. Experiences in some countries (e.g., Canada) show that total government costs after 
consolidation may actually have increased, at least in the short term (Sancton, 2008; 
Deller, 1998). Several reasons are behind those results: for example, difficulties in 
retrenching public servants due to labor agreements, or salaries that are brought up (or 
equalized) to the higher level observed pre-merger. 
2. Political opposition and institutional friction may help explain why voluntary merger 
programs in countries like Peru and Spain have failed to produce substantial results 
(Herrero et al., 2010; Bosch and Suarez-Pandiello, 2008). 
3. However, the theoretical linkages between economic growth and the decentralization of 
expenditure still await more conclusive empirical evidence (see Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab, 2003). 
4. Contrary to his expectations, Nelson also finds that greater racial homogeneity 
(assumed to be a reflection of lower preference heterogeneity) leads to higher fragmen­
tation, a surprising result. 
5. It is argued that local government production functions present economies of scope, 
that is, that the output from the joint production of local public goods or services is 
greater than the output obtained with two separate processes, using the same amount 
of input (Panzar and Willig, 1977). 
6. County formation in several of the U.S. states, for instance, has been particularly 
determined by this. Historical records from Kentucky and Georgia show that county 
boundaries were drawn ensuring no citizen resided more than a day's ride from the 
county seat. Considering the strong historical inertia of jurisdictional formation, con­
stituents' proximity to local governments may have been the single most important 
determinant of jurisdictional fragmentation. 
7. A preference for proximity to institutions governing the management of common 
services may be behind, for example, the widespread creation of homeowner associa­
tions in the U.S. The latter are truly miniature local private governments providing 
services traditionally under the responsibility of county governments (such as water 
supply, garbage collection, etc.). Although the creation of such associations is often 
due to legal requirements of urban site development, they also arise spontaneously 
and, in any case, have expanded enormously over the last 20 years, representing now 
nearly 20% of American dwellers. Across the board, the services provided by these 
associations, and the characteristics of such services do not differ greatly from those 
previously offered by elected governments, although differences can be found at the 
margin. 
8. In light of the small statistical significance of a single vote, a large literature has devel­
oped attempting to explain why individuals vote at all (especially considering the cost 
of voting is not negligible), the so-called "voting paradox". Explanations have included 
a desire to maintain democracy (Downs, 1957), or even the exercise of a sense of duty 
(Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). The general conclusion of this literature is that, despite 
the weight carried by the alternative explanations, the paradox remains largely unre­
solved (Blais and Young, 1999). 
9. Home rule is defined in Nelson (1992) as the allocation of significant autonomy to local 
governments in carrying out local functions. 
10. See, for example, the case of Toronto discussed in Sancton (2008). 
11. These include whether a referendum or majority approval is required for a territory to 
be annexed to a city or for the consolidation of two or more jurisdictions. 
12. We must note here that there should be a certain degree of endogeneity between 
observed levels of fragmentation and economies of scale. If economies of scale should 
be expected to lead to lower fragmentation, it is also true that higher fragmentation 
should lead to observed lower economies of scale. Potentially, the endogeneity problem 
is properly addressed by using instrumental variables for economies of scale, as those 
discussed in this section, that can be considered truly exogenous. 
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13. The measure is a composite one, including values on aspects such as availability of new 
technologies, firm-level technology absorption, legal ICT framework, FD1 and technol­
ogy transfer, mobile and internet coverage, and personal computers per capita. 
14. However, there can be important differences between the private and public sectors in 
their ability to incorporate new technologies. In particular, the public sector may suffer 
from Baumol's disease due to the over presence of labor intensive production processes, 
and simply witness a rise in salaries in response to productivity increases in the private 
sector. 
15. For example, Martinez-Vazquez et al. (1997) use the share of minorities over the total 
population in their analysis of the impact of race dispersion on school district consoli­
dation in the U.S. 
16. But these issues are not necessarily well defined. For example, senior citizens should 
care about their house values and in general one may expect a link, as has been 
found in the U.S., between school quality and housing values; senior citizens may 
also care for the quality of education received by their grandchildren attending local 
schools. 
17. As an example of the inter-temporal caveat mentioned above, if a nationalistic party 
has just been elected, despite its ideological leanings, it might not be able to affect the 
jurisdictional organization of the country unless it remains in power for an extended 
period of time. From that point of view, this variable is less likely to be significant in 
cross-sectional analyses. 
18. For example, the 1978 Spanish Constitution only defined the different levels of govern­
ment (regional, provincial, municipal). The Organic Law regulating this constitutional 
aspect established that in instances where regions are formed by just one province, the 
provincial level of government is subsumed into the regional one as there is perfect 
overlap. The number of regions eventually created, and the number of municipalities 
existing currently in Spain is the result of an institutional process where most forces 
considered in this chapter were at play. To date the Constitution in Spain has not been 
amended to include the names of the regions in its articles. 
19. We would expect that the number of subnational tiers of government in a given country 
also depends on the number of tiers that already exist. It would become more difficult to 
add another tier if a relatively high number of subnational levels of government already 
exists. Thus, the variable is non-ordinal in nature. 
20. We used both linktest and ovtest Stata commands, with both tests supporting the 
hypothesis of no omitted variables in the model. 
21. Ideally, future research will include information on the "true value" of economies of 
scale for local services, that is, the true value of the cost elasticity of production. 
22. Among other countries, that list includes Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Chile, Czech 
Republic, South Korea, United Kingdom, and most recently Greece and Italy. 
23. It could be argued that this relationship may be endogenous, and that in more juris-
dictionally fragmented countries citizens are more participative and more likely to 
demand enhanced political accountability. However, that may not necessarily be 
the case. As already mentioned above, Lowery and Lyons (1989) find no evidence 
of better information levels of citizens at lower levels of government. In any case, it 
would seem that the construction of the interaction term should help dispel doubts 
on the possible endogeneity. The use of an independent assessment of democratic 
quality and of an index of legislative competitiveness also independent from the ter­
ritorial organization of the country should diminish the possible problem of double 
causation. 
24. Note that the variable approximating built up demands for jurisdictional fragmenta­
tion that may have been released via recent advances to the democratic quality of 
system of government proved to be non-significant. 
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